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I myself, like my deceased friend Noiré, have looked upon roots as clamor concomitans, that is, not as sound-imitations, but as actual sounds, uttered by men in common occupations, and to be heard even now.
Now, because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness of an individual action. The one he calleth bonitas generalis, concomitans, et sine qua non; by which goodness is meant the doing of an action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth himself.
If this were so, the problem of language would long since have been solved, and the first formation of ideas would require no further reflection. It must be conceded on the other side that the origin of roots still contains much that is obscure, and that even Noiré’s clamor concomitans does not explain every case.
Sect. 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered quo ad individuum, the former hath no other remunerable good in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them standeth only in objecto modo; which being so, it is all one when we speak of any individual moral action quo ad individuum, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For, as is well said by Aquinas, Necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere. And again: Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, causans and concomitans, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness, saith Scalliger, est perfectio actus cum recta ratione. Human moral actions are called good or evil, in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, saith Aquinas, thereupon inferring that illis mores dicuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui
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