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It is the field directly perceived. But the entities of this field have relations to other entities which are not particularly discriminated in this individual way. These other entities are known merely as the relata in relation to the entities of the discerned field.

I have at least explained exactly what I do mean by a point, what relations it involves and what entities are the relata. If you admit the relativity of space, you also must admit that points are complex entities, logical constructs involving other entities and their relations.

It is fairly obvious that the Leibnizian monadology is the necessary outcome of any such philosophy. If you dislike pluralism, there will be only one monad. Other schools of philosophy admit relations but obstinately refuse to contemplate relations with more than two relata. I do not think that this limitation is based on any set purpose or theory.

Such an entity is merely a 'something' which has such-and-such definite relations to some definite entity or entities in the discerned field. As being thus related, they are owing to the particular character of these relations known as elements of the general fact which is going on. But we are not aware of them except as entities fulfilling the functions of relata in these relations.

My own view is a belief in the relational theory both of space and of time, and of disbelief in the current form of the relational theory of space which exhibits bits of matter as the relata for spatial relations. The true relata are events.

This view, however, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that we often know propositions in which the relation is the subject, or in which the relata are not definite given objects, but "anything." For example, we know that if one thing is before another, and the other before a third, then the first is before the third; and here the things concerned are not definite things, but "anything."

The whole being of substance is as a substratum for attributes. Thus time and space should be attributes of the substance. This they palpably are not, if the matter be the substance of nature, since it is impossible to express spatio-temporal truths without having recourse to relations involving relata other than bits of matter. I waive this point however, and come to another.

By a multiple relation I mean a relation which in any concrete instance of its occurrence necessarily involves more than two relata. For example, when John likes Thomas there are only two relata, John and Thomas. But when John gives that book to Thomas there are three relata, John, that book, and Thomas.

Produce your theory, not in a few vague phrases of indefinite meaning, but explain it step by step in definite terms referring to assigned relations and assigned relata. Also show that your theory of points issues in a theory of space.

To sum up: the termini for thought are entities, primarily with bare individuality, secondarily with properties and relations ascribed to them in the procedure of thought; the termini for sense-awareness are factors in the fact of nature, primarily relata and only secondarily discriminated as distinct individualities.