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Reasoning is nothing more than a series of relative 'suggestions of which the separate subjects are felt by us to be mutually related. Hence, too, arises his theory of generalisation. He is, he says, not a 'nominalist' but a 'conceptualist, and here, for once, agrees with Reid as against Stewart.
As preliminary to this, it has been already shown that the Conceptualist view of propositions, viz. that they assert a relation between two ideas, and the Nominalist, that they assert agreement or disagreement between the meanings of two names, are both wrong as general theories: for that generally the import of propositions is, to affirm or deny respecting a phenomenon, or its hidden source, one of five kinds of facts.
To call them the same we must treat them as if each were simultaneously its own other, a feat on conceptualist principles impossible of performance. On the principle of going behind the conceptual function altogether, however, and looking to the more primitive flux of the sensational life for reality's true shape, a way is open to us, as I tried in my last lecture to show.
It is the general conceptualist difficulty of any one thing being the same with many things, either at once or in succession, for the abstract concepts of oneness and manyness must needs exclude each other. In the particular instance that we have dwelt on so long, the one thing is the all-form of experience, the many things are the each-forms of experience in you and me.
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