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More comprehensively, but from a precisely similar standpoint, Driesch has followed up the discussion of this problem. He is, of all modern investigators, perhaps the one who has most persistently and thoroughly worked out the problem of causal and teleological interpretation, and he has also thrown much light on the scientific and epistemological aspects of the problem.

We are thus left with two kinds of unity in the experienced world; the one what we may call the epistemological unity, due merely to the fact that my experienced world is what one experience selects from the sum total of existence: the other that tentative and partial unity exhibited in the prevalence of scientific laws in those portions of the world which science has hitherto mastered.

Purely speculative questions relative to the evolution theory, psychological and metaphysical, logical and epistemological, ethical, æsthetic, and finally even historical and politico-economical questions have been drawn into the coil, and usually receive from the Darwinians an answer at once robust and self-assured.

But did such Platonists actually exist before Plotinus, or possibly Ammonius Saccus? The fragmentary evidence which exists seems to show that philosophic Greeks were interested in other problems mainly epistemological and psychological. The belief in the immortality of the soul was preserved by the tradition of the Mysteries, not by the Academy.

The pragmatist, being himself a man, and imagining in general no contrary lines of truer belief than ours about the 'reality' which he has laid at the base of his epistemological discussion, is willing to treat our satisfactions as possibly really true guides to it, not as guides true solely for US. It would seem here to be the duty of his critics to show with some explicitness why, being our subjective feelings, these satisfactions can not yield 'objective' truth.

But worked thus, it is a metaphysical theory about the matter of reality, and flies far beyond pragmatism's own modest analysis of the nature of the knowing function, which analysis may just as harmoniously be combined with less humanistic accounts of reality. One of pragmatism's merits is that it is so purely epistemological.

It comprised eight lectures, under the title: 'Mathematics, Scientific Experiment and Observation, and Epistemological Results from the Standpoint of Anthroposophy'; what they gave me answered my question beyond all expectation.

But now what do we mean by POINTING, in such a case as this? What is the pointing known-as, here? To this question I shall have to give a very prosaic answer one that traverses the pre-possessions not only of common sense and scholasticism, but also those of nearly all the epistemological writers whom I have ever read.

Zeus-like in shooting his thunder bolts, albeit thunder bolts of conversation against that soft epistemological core of a man's mind which realized that nothing was known absolutely, he could easily impart the venom of doubt.

It seems to me that the word 'as, which qualifies the relation here, and bears the whole 'epistemological' burden, is anything but simple. What it most immediately suggests is that the idea should be LIKE the object; but most of our ideas, being abstract concepts, bear almost no resemblance to their objects.