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These two ways of using words, including their occurrence in inner speech, may be spoken of together as the use of words in "thinking." If we are right, the use of words in thinking depends, at least in its origin, upon images, and cannot be fully dealt with on behaviourist lines.
The child is not seeing a motor, but only remembering one; the hearer does not look round in expectation of seeing a motor coming, but "understands" that a motor came at some earlier time. The whole of this occurrence is much more difficult to account for on behaviourist lines.
Kempf, E.J. The Tonus of the Autonomic Segments as Causes of Abnormal Behaviour. Jour. Nerv. & Ment. Disease, Jan., 1920, pp. 1-34. Krafft-Ebing, R. Psychopathia Sexualis. Fuchs, Stuttgart, 1907. Pavlov, J.P. L'excitation Psychique des Glandes Salivaires. Jour de Psychologie, 1910, No. 2, pp. 97-114. Watson, J.B. Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1919.
With this conclusion we may leave the emotions and pass to the consideration of the will. The first thing to be defined when we are dealing with Will is a VOLUNTARY MOVEMENT. We have already defined vital movements, and we have maintained that, from a behaviourist standpoint, it is impossible to distinguish which among such movements are reflex and which voluntary.
The behaviourist, who attempts to make psychology a record of behaviour, has to trust his memory in making the record. "Habit" is a concept involving the occurrence of similar events at different times; if the behaviourist feels confident that there is such a phenomenon as habit, that can only be because he trusts his memory, when it assures him that there have been other times.
It is sometimes suggested, by those who favour behaviourist views, that recognition consists in behaving in the same way when a stimulus is repeated as we behaved on the first occasion when it occurred. This seems to be the exact opposite of the truth. The essence of recognition is in the DIFFERENCE between a repeated stimulus and a new one.
I think the strangeness of what they report would be greatly diminished if it were expressed in the language of a behaviourist theory of desire, rather than in the language of every-day beliefs.
Blanchard, P. A Psychoanalytic Study of Auguste Comte. Am. Jour. Psy., April, 1918. Watson, J.B. Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1919.
I do not like to distinguish them by means of such notions as "consciousness" or "will," because I do not think these notions, in any definable sense, are always applicable. Moreover, the purpose of the theory we are examining is to be, as far as possible, physiological and behaviourist, and this purpose is not achieved if we introduce such a conception as "consciousness" or "will."
We are all willing to admit that other people are thoughtless. But when it comes to ourselves, we feel convinced that we can actually perceive our own thinking. "Cogito, ergo sum" would be regarded by most people as having a true premiss. This, however, the behaviourist denies. He maintains that our knowledge of ourselves is no different in kind from our knowledge of other people.
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